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Abstract 
In this contribution we focus on codes as a particular form of civil regulation that is 
adopted by non-state actors to regulate internal behaviors. Governments increasingly 
encourage codes and forms of civil regulation in order to protect or to advance 
governmental objectives in the public interest. We will argue that codes - and with it civil 
regulation – have better chances of serving the public interest if (1) government, private 
actors and stakeholders agree on the norms in the standard-setting process, (2) if the 
codes are binding and (3) there are mechanisms to enforce compliance.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
Codes may be defined in terms of the function they perform in society, in terms of their 
core elements, or in terms of what they mean to different actors in daily practice (cf. 
Black, 2002). There is no single definition, but most scholars agree on the observation 
that codes are written documents that lay down standards which communicate what 
behaviors are (morally) required (Schwartz, 1991; Pater and Van Gils, 2003). They are a 
prevalent regulatory instrument for ethical guidance or social responsibility to be found 
everywhere from single organizations, to professional and trade associations and to 
large multinationals (Wood and Rimmer, 2003). Codes still grow in number as 
governments, associations, and special interest groups increasingly call for the 
establishment of such codes (Schwartz, 2002: 27).1  
 
Private organizations like multinationals and banks use codes as a particular instance of 
civil-to-business and business-to-business regulation. They may have different reasons 
1  To illustrate the prevalence of codes we quote Schwartz (2002: 27): “In the U.S., over 
ninety percent of large corporations have a code of ethics (Center for Business Ethics, 1992), 
while in Canada eighty-five percent have a code (KPMG, 2000). Of the largest European 
corporations, fifty-seven percent of U.K. companies have a code (Le Jeune and Webley, 1998), 
fiftyone percent of German companies have a code (Schlegelmilch and Langlois, 1990), and thirty 
percent of French companies have a code (Schlegelmilch and Langlois, 1990).” In a comparative 
study of corporate governance codes from 2002 the Internal Market Directorate General of the 
European Commission found 35 national corporate governance codes, one third of them in the 
United Kingdom.1  
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for doing so, such as the wish to (re)gain the trust of the public, to express their 
corporate social responsibility, to discourage free riders or to prevent government from 
imposing too strict legislation. The corporate governance codes of private organizations 
have inspired several national corporate governance codes. At the international level a 
harmonization of codes can be observed, for instance through the 'OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance'. In a comparative study of corporate governance codes codes 
are said to be beneficial in a number of ways: “Codes stimulate discussion of corporate 
governance issues, they encourage companies to adopt widely-accepted governance 
standards, they help explain both governance-related legal requirements and common 
corporate governance practices to investors, they can be used to benchmark 
supervisory and management bodies and they may help prepare the ground for changes 
in securities regulation and company law, where such changes are deemed necessary”.2 
Codes increasingly are applied by civil actors in the non-profit and (semi-)public sectors, 
where they are adopted to communicate professional or organizational values, to 
regulate their integrity policy or for reasons of standardization. A particular instance are 
professional codes, which are viewed as the most visible and explicit enunciation of 
norms that embody the collective conscience of a profession (Frankel, 1989: 110).3  
 
In this contribution we will discuss codes from three different perspectives: an 
organizational perspective, a governance perspective and a (public-private) hybrid 
perspective. The organizational perspective is concerned with codes drawn up by and 
for a single (private) organization. This type of codes is mainly discussed in business 
ethics literature and refers primarily to internal controls of behavior (codes of ethics and 
codes of conduct, see Oude Vrielink & Van Montfort, 2009) (section 3). The governance 
perspective deals with codes as a regulatory tool to achieve government objectives in 
the public interest. Governments increasingly stimulate or mandate (legally conditioned) 
self-regulation to serve public interest issues (section 4). In a final step we will argue that 
in order to arrive at a better understanding of the potential and pitfalls of codes as a new 
mode of governance requires a closer look at the hybrid nature of both the composition 
of codes and the coding process. We will distinguish three dimensions to determine to 
2  Comparative Study Of Corporate Governance Codes. Relevant to the European Union 
And Its Member States On behalf of the European Commission, Internal Market Directorate 
General. Final report & Annexes I-III. January 2002, p. 11. 
3 They may comprise one or more of three conceptual elements: ideals for which practitioners 
should strive, norms which can help in dealing with ethical problems and detailed rules to govern 
professional conduct and adjudicate grievances (Frankel, 1989: 110-111). 
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what extent codes can be characterized as either more public or more private. This 
allows us to depict codes as a typical combination of public and private components a 
code is comprised of and the typical combination of public and private actors involved in 
the preceding process of standard-setting. We are of the opinion that the hybrid 
perspective offers a more refined picture of the chances and risks involved in the use of 
codes as a new regulatory instrument to protect or advance public objectives. This 
approach provides a deeper understanding of what components help or hamper the 
adoption and actual operation of codes. In a final step we will try and work out what 
strengths and weakness are involved in the use of codes.   
 
2. The concept of codes 
In the most general sense the concept of a code refers to collections of rules and 
regulations, generally signifying a written set of action prescriptions (Kaptein & Schwartz, 
2007).4 Sometimes the set of rules and regulations are of a similar nature but referred to 
by different names, such as codes of ethics, codes of conduct, codes of practice, 
business codes, integrity codes, codes of honour, voluntary agreements, guidelines, and 
recommendations (Petrick and Quinn, 1997; Kaptein, 2004; Kaptein and Schwartz, 
2007; Baarsma et al, 2003: 26; Huyse & Parmentier, 1990: 255). Most scholars treat 
them as synonyms, while others deliberately discern between the different meanings. 
They use different names to discriminate between more ethical and practical contents, 
between general and situational applicability, or to express a difference between general 
ideals and more concrete action prescriptions (e.g. Anheier & List, 2005; Wood & 
Rimmer, 2003; Baarsma et al, 2003: 26). The common denominator in the various 
definitions of codes is that they consist of rules and regulations that articulate action 
prescriptions with the intention of moral guidance. Codes are applied as regulatory tools 
by public or private actors that - individually or in concerted action - regulate what rules 
and regulations are to guide individual and collective action. Often codes comprise 
dispute management rules and provisions to sanction infringements (Huyse & 
Parmentier, 1990; Baarsma et al, 2003). As such, codes among other things deal with 
an organization’s “social license to operate” (Kagan et al, 2003) which might explain why 
scandals usually invoke a sudden rise in popularity of codes. Codes are drawn up to 
visibly express corporate, sector or professional values in order to (re)gain public trust 
4 This focus on explicating behavioral standards on paper links the definition to the Latin 
origin of the term “code”, which indicates wooden boards covered with wax used to write. 
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(cf. Wood & Rimmer, 2003). Codes thus assist organizations in their ongoing 
relationship with society by helping them to balance their pursuit of autonomy and the 
public’s demand for accountability (Frankel, 1989; Higgs-Kleyn & Kapelianis, 1999).  
 
Codes in principal are autonomous forms of regulation separate from statutory or 
international law. But since governments have recognized the limited possibilities of law 
they are looking for alternative forms of regulatory government the beyond law (Scott, 
2009). Governments try to stimulate governance by non-governmental actors. Private 
standardization, certification (see the contribution of Tim Bartley in this volume, Bartley, 
2011), ranking, voluntary agreements like covenants and also codes are popular tools of 
self- and co-regulation. The result is a complex mix of hard and soft law arrangements, 
like legally binding codes in some semi-public sectors. So codes are not necessarily a 
type of VAR (a voluntary approach to regulation, see Töller in this volume, Töller, 2011). 
 
But codes do not only offer chances for serving public values, but also bear risks. Most 
codes have a strong normative profile. It is not always clear how those norms can and 
will be realized. Some codes do not go beyond the symbolic level. A lack of will, 
competence or agreement may be the cause. It is also possible that the code was set up 
only for the sake of appearances or to prevent government from lawmaking. The 
attention to the normative site of the code can be so high that the compliance site is a 
little bit neglected by the participants. In practice many codes face a lack of knowledge 
about the state of compliance and when it is measured a compliance deficit might be 
discovered.  
 
Codes have inspired an extensive body of research in various literatures. In business 
ethics literature codes predominantly are studied as a device of ethical guidance within 
single (private) organizations. Topic areas commonly dealt with in business ethics 
literature are the content of codes and issues related to the effects of codes on behavior. 
Scholars of governance and of regulation or regulatory reform start from a somewhat 
different angle. They take an interest in codes as a particular mode or instrument of 
regulation that is applied in the context public policy objectives. It is part of a larger 
debate about new modes of regulation and the role of a government to preserve public 
interest issues. In past decades, governments of many advanced western countries 
encouraged self-regulation as a means to achieve public policy goals. Various terms are 
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in use to label the new regulatory modes.5 They have in common that private rule-
making at least to some extent is conditioned by the state, whereas their variation 
applies to how and to what extent the state intervenes in the self-regulatory practices.6 A 
particular line of inquiry in this debate involves the study of codes as a regulatory tool to 
regulate the structures and processes of internal governance to serve public interest 
issues. Literature and research on this type of codes can be found in governance 
literature and mainly involves topics such as oversight, public accountability or 
stakeholderdialogues. 
 
3. Codes from an organizational perspective    
From an organizational perspective codes are used to communicate to both insiders and 
outsiders what norms ought to govern behavior. Modern organizations are regulated by 
government to prevent them from pursuing their own interest at the cost of the common 
good. The movement toward increased ethical guidance and government intervention is 
rooted in what is called the “corporate social contract”.  In return for legal accountability 
through organizational management to shareholders and the general public a 
corporation is given the right to pursue its stated objectives (Brooks, 1989: 117). This 
principle replaces the early industrial believe that “what is good for business is good for 
the country”. In past decades unions and governments have both awakened to their 
power to influence or control corporations. Shareholders' rights no longer are looked 
upon as properly dominating the rights of all other stakeholders. Because of this new 
operating rationale for corporations in western, capitalistic societies companies 
nowadays face a dual test of legality and moral acceptability (Brooks, 1989), which lead 
them to perform beyond the law (cf. Kagan, Gunningham and Thornton, 2003). Frankel 
(1989: 109, 110) points to a similar movement toward increased ethical guidance in the 
context of professions; society's granting of power and privilege to the professions is 
premised on their willingness and ability to contribute to social well-being and to conduct 
their affairs in a manner consistent with broader social values. This relationship he refers 
to as the “society-profession nexus”. 
 
5  To name a few examples: coerced self-regulation (Black, 1996), mandated self-
regulation (Rees, 1988), instigated self-regulation (Ukrow, 1999), enforced regulation (Brien, 
1998), and co-regulation (Senden, 2005), smart regulation (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998)   
6  In the late eighties, for instance, a trend to more formalized codes and an increasing 
reliance on statutory or administrative provisions could be observed (Baggott, 1989). 
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In business ethics literature conceptual and empirically oriented studies on codes can be 
divined into two main orientations, that is, content oriented research (what is or should 
be in the actual codes) and output oriented research (what effects on behavior they have 
or should have).7 These lines of inquiry deal with different knowledge interests and 
bodies of knowledge on codes. Helin & Sandström (2007) reviewed 38 studies on 
corporate codes with an empirical content, published during the period of 1994 to mid-
2005. The conclusion of their review is that most of these studies are content-oriented 
targeting what is in the actual codes (e.g. Lefebvre & Singh, 1996; Preble & Hoffman, 
1999; Wood, 2000; Carasco & Singh, 2003; Singh, Carasco, Svensson, Wood & 
Callaghan, 2005), sometimes with an additional normative view of what it should be 
comprised of (e.g. Wood & Rimmer, 2003; cf. Boers & Van Montfort, 2006). They have 
witnessed a particular focus on mapping the content in terms of country- or non-country-
specific characteristics. The overall view that results from content-oriented studies is that 
regardless of their geographical origin codes are similarly designed and basically share 
the same massage of moral behavior. Generally codes contain behavioral rules, rules 
concerning the endorsement of a code, the sanctioning of infringements, and rules of 
dispute management. This general pattern can be observed in national as well as cross-
national studies, though the latter also reveals some differences. For instance,  
Australian codes rely less on internal and external watchdogs than American codes do, 
which is explained by differences in business culture.8  
The second line of inquiry examines the effectiveness of codes in influencing actions 
towards “more ethical” behavior and key factors that might explain their effects. Studies 
dealing with this subject provide divergent and even conflicting conceptual views on the 
effectiveness of business codes, ranging from largely counterproductive or successful, a 
mixed view that is mirrored in results of empirical studies conducted in this field (Kaptein 
7  A third line of inquiry, which is still in its infancy, could be distinguished. It takes an 
interest in what obstacles organizations have to overcome and the mechanisms it should have in 
place in order to ensure a code is actually coming into practice. Studies adopting this perspective 
draw attention to issues such as the code’s relevance and consistency, and procedures of 
consultations, communication, education, maintenance and reinforcement.       
8  Taking this perspective a bit further these differences may be explained by legal culture, 
in particular to differences in the degree of legalism and adversarialism. Legalism in this context 
refers to being formalistic, which “makes for precision, transparency, security and predictability, 
but at the cost of rigidity, bureaucracy, cumbersomeness and costliness” (Van Waarden, 2009: 
200). Adversarialism refers to antagonistic relations and reliance on social systems structuring 
conflict by channeling it formally, for instance in court, in order to be able to control such conflict 
(Van Waarden, 2009:200). As we will show later on in this contribution, codes may vary on the 
dimension of legalism, and consequently differ in the risks and chances involved in their use as a 
means to achieve public objectives. 
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& Schwartz, 2007). In a similar vein, reviewing 79 empirical studies that examine the 
effectiveness of business codes, Kaptein & Schwartz (2007: 113) conclude that these 
studies present a mixed image: “35% of the studies have found that codes are effective, 
16% have found that the relationship is weak, 33% have found that there is no significant 
relationship, and 14% have presented mixed results. Only one study has found that 
business codes could be counterproductive”.9  
To establish the potential of codes in terms of whether they are or could be effective a 
different research approach is required; contextual factors inside or outside the 
corporation should be taken into consideration (Helin & Sandström, 2007; Kaptein & 
Schwartz, 2007).  
 
4. Codes from a governance perspective 
The various currents in the literature discussed in this section are also engaged in 
regulating behavior within organizations but in a different way. The difference with 
business ethics codes in literature is that organizations or their representatives are 
invited by the government or entrusted to regulate themselves for the realization of a 
public interest. A second difference is that in the governance literature, codes as most 
often discussed as a certain type of regulation instead of being treated as an 
independent object of study. In the business ethics literature codes are frequently an 
isolated object of study. 
 
In governance literature the growing interest in self-regulation indicates a shift from 
government to governance. In this literature on governance, codes are dealt with as a 
particular instance of self-regulatory mechanisms that replace or supplement direct state 
regulation. Self-regulation describes a horizontal extension of government as it includes 
private and societal actors in the regulatory process (Rhodes, 1997; Schmitter, 2001). 
State and society share a responsibility for the realization of public policy goals and 
consequently self-regulation is perceived of as a means to be applied in the public 
interest. At the vertical level government is extended by regulatory arrangements at the 
local, regional, national, supra- and international level. Consequently, the focus is on the 
9  Kaptein & Schwartz (2007) conceive of a ‘‘business code’’ as a code that is developed 
by and for a given company. Such codes are one of the layers of a whole range of codes for 
business consisting also professional, industrial, national and international codes. 
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interplay between multiple levels of control instead of on the national government (Latzer 
et al, 2003).  
According to Baggott (1989: 435, 436) amongst political scientists at least three 
perspectives can be identified within the academic debate. Firstly, corporatists tend to 
see self-regulation as further evidence of a corporate state in which state authority is 
devolved to private organizations that in turn regulate their members (Schmitter 1985). 
Secondly, supporters of a minimal state consider self-regulation as a possible means of 
rolling back the state (Hughes, 1985). And thirdly, in a particular strand of public 
administration literature self-regulation is seen as a particular form of quasi-government, 
raising questions and problems of accountability and public control (Hood, 1978). In 
addition to this a fourth perspective could be discerned; that of the regulatory state 
(Majone, 1994; Braithwaite, 2000; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004). This line of inquiry deals 
with the gradual shift from (re)distributive policies to rule-making, taking a special 
interest in the rise and role of specialized, independent regulatory agencies (Latzer et al, 
2003; Christensen and Lægreid, 2006). Self-regulation is presented as a particular type 
of regulatory reform next to deregulation, better regulation, re-regulation and meta-
regulation. It represents a further step away from traditional, hierarchic state regulation 
towards less formalized means of regulation which are carried out by private or semi-
private regulatory institutions.  
In literature on regulation several scholars have addressed the use of self-regulatory 
mechanisms to help achieve public interest issues by various names such as “the remix 
of traditional and alternative regulation” (Latzer et al, 2003: 127), “decentralized 
regulation” (Black, 2002; cf. Scott, 2004), “industry self-regulation” (Gunningham and 
Rees, 1997) or “smart regulation” (Gunningam, Grabosky and Sinclair, 1998). They start 
from the premise that government regulation may perform better if it incorporates the 
benefits of self-regulation. The following potential advantages of self-regulation are 
perceived: compliance enhancement, flexibility, a quick and informed response, lesser 
public expenditures (Gunningham & Rees 1997; Abbott & Snidal 2000: 421; Cutler 2003: 
23; Havinga 2006; Trubek & Trubek 2005; Trubek, Cottrell & Nance 2006; Abbot & 
Snidal 2009).  
In sum, in the literature on regulation, regulatory reform and governance codes 
commonly are treated as a self-regulatory instrument and are discussed in the context of 
the broader trend to apply new modes of regulation to preserve public interest issues.  
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5. Codes from a hybrid perspective 
From the organizational perspective the public interest is served in the specific content 
and output of codes and from the governance perspective the public interest is served in 
‘joining up’ the regulatory process or by transferring the regulatory process to private 
actors. Both perspectives offer however a limited view on risks and chances for serving 
the public interest by codes. To better understand the strengths and weaknesses 
involved in the use of codes as a new mode of regulation we need to pay close attention 
to the question of what the regulation comprises and how the regulation is carried out. In 
this contribution we therefore argue that a code’s potential in serving the public interest 
can be understood properly only by taking into account (a) its hybrid composition (b) and 
the hybrid character of the ‘coding’ process.  
 
The content of codes and the process of coding are never pure public or pure private. In 
civil regulation in the shape of codes always both public and private interests, motives, 
incentives, effects and behavior play a role. That is why we called earlier codes and the 
coding process a ‘practice between public and private’. Rather than through the state, 
civil regulation operates beside or around the state; it is based on ‘soft law’ rather than 
legally binding standards. It is rooted in traditional forms of self-regulation but goes 
beyond it to include second and/or third party regulation.10 In this hybrid practice the 
public interest is guaranteed if responsiveness to needs, wishes and preferences of 
relevant public and private stakeholders is well served. Therefore in our opinion codes - 
and with it civil regulation - will serve the public interest better if (1) government, private 
parties and stakeholders agree on the norms, (2) the codes are binding and (3) there are 
mechanisms to enforce compliance. With regard to the regulatory process (‘coding’) to 
arrive at a code public interest is served best if the relevant public and private 
stakeholders and interests are involved in this process.  
 
The hybrid composition of codes 
The hybrid composition of codes appears on three levels: 
10 Following Levi-Faur (see introductory chapter, see also Van Waarden, 2011) we consider first 
third party regulation to mean forms of self-regulation in which the regulator is also the regulatee. 
Second party regulation denotes forms of regulation in which the regulator is independent and 
distinct from the regulatee. In third party regulation, the relations between the regulator and the 
regulatee are mediated by a third party that acts as independent or semi-independent regulatory-
auditor. 
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- The regulatory bodies: who defines the normative content of a code 
(government, private parties and/or stakeholders)? 
- Legal status: does the code refer to (legal and obligatory) regulation (is it binding 
from a legislative perspective) or is it a voluntary non-coercive agreement? 
- Compliance mechanism: is there anyone who cares about compliance and if yes, 
who takes care, who can sanction non-compliance, do stakeholders have 
opportunities to complain? 
 
The content (norms) of codes, for example, can be defined by private parties, but at the 
same time be established in law and enforceable by stakeholders. This strengthens the 
public character of the code. But in other cases the content of codes will be defined by or 
at least framed by the government (think of norms about integrity or wages), don’t codes 
have a legal status are there no instruments for compliance.  
 
The typology of codes in terms of hybridity provides us with a means to arrive at a more 
refined judgment of codes as a device to serve public interest issues.  So to get a better 
understanding of codes as regulatory mechanism in the public context codes should be 
categorized according to their typical combination of components of public and private 
regulation. Using components derived from legislation (‘public’) means that non-
compliance is regarded as behavior against the law and can be dealt with accordingly, 
whereas components of self-regulation (‘private’) leaves questions of ethics and 
discipline to private organizations or their associations (Brien, 1998). Starting from the 
premise that behavioral effects might occur from the combination of public and private 
rules identifying and proscribing what behavior is required on the one hand and 
regulatory provisions to deter or punish non-compliance on the other hand, codes to that 
effect may comprise components of legislation and self-regulation.  
 
Huyse & Parmentier (1990: 261, 262) point out that all of the arguments for and against  
codes pertain to situations in which the codes are drafted unilaterally and function 
indigenously. In cases of other types of codes, such as joint codes or codes 
administered by a government office, different arguments apply. In the latter situation, for 
example, consumer organizations have more confidence in codes. They feel the code 
can set higher standards for consumer protection, can guarantee cheap and speedy 
methods of dispute settlement and can be (re)negotiated without undue delay. From this 
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example we learn that the relative dominance of public and private components of a 
code affects its (perceived) benefits or limitations. This not only holds true for codes, but 
other self-regulatory instruments as well. It thus should be possible to surmise what risks 
and chances the different types of codes involve based on the public-private profiles.  
 
Hybridity of the regulatory process  
Not only the norms, legal status or compliance mechanisms can vary in degree of 
‘publicness’ (Bozeman, 1987), but also the process of regulation itself.  
 
In recent decades codes increasingly are found in the realm of combined public and 
private normative orders. They have become prevalent self-regulatory mechanisms 
applied to help achieve public policy goals. From the early eighties of the previous 
century governments in the United States, Europe, and other advanced western 
economies strongly promoted the adoption of such codes. Codes and other instruments 
of self-regulation were hailed as a more flexible, effective and efficient alternative for 
direct state regulation. These new modes of regulation were inspired by various political 
and economic trends, such as growing protests against the expanding body of 
government regulation (“juridification”), an emergent awareness of the poor quality and 
ineffectiveness of state imposed regulation (“regulatory failure”), fiscal constraints 
inspiring a search for cost-effective regulatory controls. Furthermore, the experiments 
with self-regulation as an alternative for or supplement of legislation fitted the turn 
towards neo-liberal ideology entailing a trend to employ private sector management 
practices in the public sector, most typically reflected in New Public Management (NPM; 
see Hood 1991). This all has added to a situation in which codes increasingly can be 
found in the realm of hybrid regulation.  
Different strands in socio-legal literatures (e.g. on new governance or the 
(post)regulatory state) have shown interest in regulatory hybridization as a strategy to 
improve rule compliance and social legitimacy of regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; 
Sinclair 1997: 529-559; Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair 1998; Scott, 2002; Lobel 
2004: 343-470; Trubek 2006).11 Hybridization in these contexts has three different 
meanings that overlap both in the empirical world and in scholarly discussion. To quote 
Halpern (2008: 85) on this subject regulatory hybridity “can refer to regulation that 
11  A similar interest could be witnessed among political scientists dealing with issues of 
self-regulation from a corporatist or quasi-govenment point of view (Schmitter, 1985; Hood, …) 
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combines governmental (public) and non-governmental (private) components. It can 
refer to oversight arrangements with multiple levels, joining centralized and regional or 
local features. It can refer to regulatory processes that engage a full range of 
participants, including professionals, divisions of government, public interest advocates, 
and representatives of groups being regulated”.  
Codes produced in the realm of hybrid regulation reveal a great variety in their typical 
combinations of state and non-state input at different regulatory levels and in the relative 
dominance of public and private components. We agree on Huyse & Parmentier’s (1990: 
256) claim that in order to value a code’s potential it is important to have a clear 
understanding of the differences amongst codes. They can be categorized by means of 
various perspectives, each leading to the identification of certain types of codes. For 
instance, one way to classify codes applied by Huyse & Parmentier (1990: 257) is by 
looking at the number of parties involved in adopting a code to distinguish between 
unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral codes. Another perspective, focusing on means by 
which codes function once they are established, leads them to the differentiation 
between indigenous, joint, and administered codes (1990: 258). In this contribution we 
developed a typology of codes according to what we call their ‘public-private profile’, 
referring to the relative dominance of public and private regulatory components.. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The use of codes as an instrument to help achieve public policy objectives is rather new. 
Traditionally organizations adopt codes to communicate what the organization stands for 
(e.g. mission statements), to govern individual and organizational conduct in situations of 
moral ambiguity or conflicts of interests, or to express their social responsibility. 
Regardless of whether a code is adopted to serve public policy objectives or 
organizational interests, it almost invariably combines public and private elements. This 
hybrid nature needs to be taken into account if we want a better understanding of a 
code’s potential as a regulatory tool of civil regulation. The hybridization of codes refers 
to both the self-regulatory process of standard-setting, implementation and enforcement 
and the code as a product of this self-regulatory process. The regulatory bodies involved 
in this process and the nature of the norms and the compliance mechanisms thus can be 
public or private. 
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Codes are an expression of civil regulation, whether we take a look at codes of ethics or 
governance codes. In most cases this kind of civil regulation is not pure ‘civil’, but a mix 
of public and private elements. Both the norms, legal status, compliance mechanisms 
ánd the process of regulation show action and influence of the state as well as initiatives 
from ‘below’. We argue that the degree of responsiveness to the needs, opinions and 
preferences of public and private stakeholders of both the codes as the coding 
processes (regulation) is crucial for serving the public interest. So the public-private mix 
that is the most responsive on both the codes as the coding processes (regulation) will 
guarantee the best the public interest that is involved in civil regulation by codes. 
 
To conclude our contribution we will address the issue of the strengths and weaknesses 
of codes as a regulatory instrument to protect or advance the public interest. Since the 
codes are promoted as an alternative to direct command and control regulation we will 
describe them in terms of the potential advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation 
compared to direct regulation.  
Codes are stimulated or even mandated by governments to deal with the weaknesses of 
command and control regulation. In the introductory chapter six shortcomings are 
emphasized: (a) expensive and ineffective regulatory strategies; (b) inflexible regulatory 
strategies that encourage adversarial enforcement; (c) legal constraints on the subjects, 
procedures, and scope of regulatory discretion; (d) regulatees’ resentment, which leads 
to non-compliance or “creative compliance”; (e) strict regulation that often presents an 
obstacle to innovation; and (f) regulation that often serves to set a lowest common 
denominator for regulatees to follow rather than supplying incentives for improved 
standards. 
Codes can have strengths compared to direct regulation, they can take away the 
shortcomings of direct regulation. But codes have their disadvantages too (see also Van 
Waarden about the strengths and weaknesses of third party regulation in this volume, 
Van Waarden, 2011).  
According to the governance literature, regulation may perform better if the benefits of 
both, self-regulation and legislation, are incorporated into the regulatory system. Then 
regulation may benefit from the following potential advantages of self-regulation 
(Selznick 1992; Teubner, 1997; Gunningham & Rees 1997; Abbott & Snidal 2000: 421; 
Cutler 2003: 23; Havinga 2006; Trubek & Trubek 2005; Trubek, Cottrell & Nance 2006; 
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Trubek et al 2008; Abbot & Snidal 2009; Mascini & Wijk 2009; Dorbeck-Jung et al, 
2010): 
• Compliance enhancement: self-regulation is said to support the internalization of 
norms; it is expected that actors usually will accept the rules of conduct they agreed 
upon and follow them in regulatory practice. 
• Responsiveness and flexibility: self-regulation seems to be able to respond to 
demands for frequent norm changes, diversity, space for multiple interpretations and 
experimentation to achieve optimal results according to social and technical 
development.  
• Quick response: self-regulation is set up informally, which seems to speed up 
regulation. 
• Informed response: self-regulation is based on domain expertise, which is said to be 
essential for effective regulation. 
• Efficiency enhancement: if private organizations pay the costs of self-regulation, 
public expenditures can decrease. 
 
In combinations of self-regulation with legislation, the additional advantages of legislation 
could be: 
• Reliability: legislation is required to be clear, coherent, stable and predictable. A 
reliable framework for action is said to be essential for policy goals. 
• Sanctions: legislation provides for sanctions; the effectiveness of regulation seems 
to be supported by credible threats of enforcement. 
• Broad interest recognition: legislation is required to pursue public interests and to 
strike a balance between conflicting interests. 
 
When legislation and self-regulation are combined to achieve public policy goals, 
however, the result may be to introduce not only the advantages of both regulatory tools, 
but also their deficiencies. In the case of self-regulation, the potential deficiencies are 
lack of reliability, transparency and binding sanctions, as well as biased interest 
recognition (Levin 1967; Gunningham 1995; Vogel 2009). Theoretically, legislation may 
be accompanied by the disadvantages of rigidity and lack of tailored control. 
Furthermore, when legislation and self-regulation are combined, tensions between the 
interests on which the two regulatory instruments are based (public versus private 
interest) may be counterproductive in regulatory practice (Gunningham et al. 1998: 28). 
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